CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.643
18 February 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 18 February 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Radoslav Deyanov (Bulgaria)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 643rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and myself, to His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Mr. Jaakko Blomberg, who is addressing the Conference today for the first time since he assumed his important functions. In his present position, Mr. Blomberg replaces Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, who participated on several occasions in the work of the Conference. In fact, for the last 10 years high-level representatives from Finland have addressed our Conference, contributing in various areas of our work. In this connection, I hardly need recall the substantial contributions made by Finland to the conclusion of the Convention banning all chemical weapons, both at the political and at the technical level. I am sure that this active involvement and interest of Finland in our work is highly appreciated by the members of the Conference.

Allow me now to make my opening statement.

I am honoured, as representative of Bulgaria, to assume the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at an important juncture in the on-going process of self-examination and adaptation of the Conference to a changed political environment. The vital security interests of Bulgaria determine its full support for arms control and disarmament efforts. We need peace and a favourable environment to advance our transition to a stable democratic society and a prosperous market economy. My Government appreciates the key role that the Conference on Disarmament continues to play in strengthening international security.

Accepting the responsibility that the rule of rotation has placed on my shoulders, I feel much obliged to my distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil, for ensuring a smooth beginning of this session. Under his skilful stewardship, the Conference on Disarmament has been able to agree on its annual agenda and on the organizational arrangements, which have permitted us to get down to work expeditiously. Four ad hoc committees have been established, thus opening the way to making further progress on substantive issues.

In discharging the duties of presiding officer, I shall rely on the knowledge, experience and help of my colleagues in this chamber. I pledge to all of you my full cooperation and that of my delegation in promoting the work of the Conference. I feel much reassured by having beside me the distinguished Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, whose high competence and subtle manner of arranging the smooth proceedings of this forum I have had the privilege of knowing for many years.

This year is an en extremely important one for the efforts to reassess all elements of the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament. We very much hope that the final

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outcome of this process will enhance its effectiveness and efficiency. The Conference on Disarmament now faces a couple of urgent tasks, which I intend to discuss briefly. Firstly, the Conference is requested to transmit the results of its consideration of the ideas contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". This report has been widely considered as an important and timely contribution to the search for a more adequate conceptual basis that could help the international community respond to the new challenges to security and stability in a changed world.

Together with all of you, I feel the responsibility of coming to an early decision on our response, which will be considered at the resumed session of the First Committee, with a view to reaching concrete recommendations for appropriate action. I wish to note in this context that the persistent efforts and constructive approach of all delegations have made it possible to come to a final agreement on a substantive draft report. I am sure that you will join me in expressing appreciation to Ambassador Amorim of Brazil for his able guidance, which has ensured a speedy completion of the open-ended consultations. I am glad to note that the Conference has contemplated producing a positively-worded result which represents its members' collective consideration of issues addressed in the "New dimensions" report.

It is worth mentioning that we all realize that the end of the cold war has not rendered disarmament and arms control efforts obsolete. There are reasons to believe that the new conditions of international security have even reinforced the relevance of disarmament and arms regulations. The new international environment facilitates the conclusion of additional bilateral and multilateral agreements that would establish and codify security at lower levels of armaments. I trust that the whole international community will share the view that the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral body for disarmament negotiations, has an increased role to play.

I find it important that a general feeling exists that the new international circumstances call for a new approach to international security. There is no doubt that with the changing international situation the very concept of disarmament and arms regulation as a key element in the pursuit of security has to be expanded and further enriched. We are all aware that disarmament and arms regulations, while not an end in itself, can now fulfil its real task as a major instrument of international security.

The final version of this draft report of the Conference has already been distributed in document CD/WP.441. Delegations have had a chance to look at the draft, and I trust that they will find it acceptable. It is my belief that the draft, which represents a delicate balance of various, sometimes quite divergent points of view, could be adopted today, with a view to its timely transmission to the First Committee.

Secondly, we also face the need to submit, to the First Committee at its resumed session a report on the status of the on-going review of the agenda, composition and method of work of the Conference on Disarmament.

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Consultations on the issues of membership and the agenda are being carried out under the able guidance of two special coordinators - Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia and Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico. I am glad to note that the exchange of views in plenary and during the intensive informal consultations on these two issues has advanced considerably. A number of interesting ideas have been presented so far, which seem to form a good basis for arriving at well-considered conclusions that would be acceptable to all. Various options have been thoroughly examined with a view to determining the best format for accurately reflecting the degree of general agreement that exists at present.

We all understand that in view of the complex character of the problems involved in the overall reassessment, concluding the on-going review may still require further efforts before we arrive at more definite results related to the agenda or to the CD membership. I believe that the relevant draft report of the Conference, being distributed today in document CD/WP.442, could give the General Assembly a fairly good idea about the status and the direction of this on-going process. As to the review of the methods of work, open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference have been conducted under the able leadership of Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan. I have been informed that the work on this important question will be resumed soon.

As my predecessor in the Chair has rightly observed, a President has to be aware of his duty to be impartial. This should not deprive him from the right to express individual thoughts and national positions, explicitly attributing them to his Government. Having said that, let me share with you briefly a couple of observations relevant to the future work of the Conference on Disarmament. The chemical weapons Convention signed at the ceremony in Paris is a testimony of the capability of this Conference to successfully negotiate agreements with vital impact on global stability and security. The Preparatory Commission in The Hague started last week an ambitious institution-building programme, which will eventually lead to the inauguration of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It will be called upon to monitor the implementation of the CW Convention and to serve as a forum for cooperation and consultation among the States parties.

These important events have closed a whole chapter of remarkable achievements in the history of the Conference on Disarmament. We enter now a new stage in developing the concept of arms control and disarmament as one of the important means to promote international security at a lower level of armaments. The Conference on Disarmament is at a crossroads. This is not because its agenda has been exhausted. We still need to continue substantive work on a number of items on its present agenda. The new political and security environment, however, compels us to start also a parallel process of adaptation of the Conference to important changes outside it. Following such a double-track course should not be seen as one act, but rather as a stage-by-stage readjustment to continuing changes in the security environment. To maintain its credibility in the future this Conference must direct much of

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its attention to the newly emerging threats to security and stability. Approaching this task with pragmatism and flexibility should be a major guiding principle. The Conference, while remaining a multilateral disarmament negotiating body, will perhaps also have to remain open to other options for using its wide experience and expertise.

Several priority areas seem to be of direct relevance to arms control and disarmament nowadays. Prevention of armed conflicts, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related dual-use technologies, measures to promote greater transparency in order to prevent destabilizing and excessive accumulation of armaments are widely considered as urgent issues deserving increased attention. These new emphases have been highlighted by the Security Council, which has the main responsibility, under the United Nations Charter, for determining threats to international peace and security.

The potential of arms control and disarmament to help prevent military conflicts has acquired added importance in the aftermath of the cold war with its specific regional instabilities and armed conflicts. Situated in the Balkans, Bulgaria directly feels the growing threat to national and regional security resulting from militant nationalism, ethnic and religious tensions. That is why we actively support the relevant arms control measures as indispensable elements of United Nations peace-keeping operations. On the same grounds, my Government sees also the need to prevent armed conflicts with conventional weapons as one of the most urgent tasks of the international community.

The General Assembly has recommended immediate practical steps to enhance security through greater transparency in armaments. Confidence-building measures designed to prevent destabilizing and excessive accumulation of arms could create a qualitatively new international environment contributing to stability in a number of regions.

Widespread optimism that the nuclear disarmament process has reached a point of irreversibility is being assessed against the growing anxiety about the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction. This problem seems to concern all countries without any exception. The START 1 and START 2 agreements, while providing for deep cuts in most destabilizing nuclear weapons, have also highlighted the need for an enhanced non-proliferation regime. A starting premise in addressing the new dimensions of this issue is the achievement of universal adherence to the existing legal instruments - the non-proliferation Treaty, the BW Convention and the CW Convention. Strengthening export controls on a cooperative multilateral basis seems to have become an important prerequisite for ensuring legitimate access of all countries - big and small - to the economic benefits of high technologies having military applications.

Current global changes and recent disarmament agreements have the potential of radically altering also the rationale of nuclear-weapon States with regard to continued testing of nuclear weapons. The unilateral moratoria on nuclear tests introduced by France, the Russian Federation and the United

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States have created favourable conditions for arriving at an early agreement on a nuclear test ban. The adherence of all nuclear-weapon States to the non-proliferation Treaty has created the necessary political environment conducive to concluding an agreement on appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States. This short review is meant to indicate that the new developments in the international environment open a wide range of possibilities for useful work to be done by the Conference on Disarmament in the future.

The Conference has a great potential to deal successfully with these challenges. We believe that this potential should be used most pragmatically to meet the hopes of the international community for greater stability and security.

That concludes my statement.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, Norway, Hungary, Sri Lanka and Canada.

I now give the floor to His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Mr. Jaakko Blomberg.

Mr. BLOMBERG (Finland): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on assuming the presidency of the Conference. The work of the Conference will be guided by your wise leadership, and I thank you very much for the kind words you expressed to Finland and to myself. It is a great pleasure for me to address this Conference today under your presidency.

For decades, the cold war governed international relations. Today global security is being built on cooperation. At the same time, there is less constraint on regional tensions and threat perceptions are more diversified. There are new challenges: increased proliferation concerns; destruction and dismantling of weapons; environmental aspects of arms control and disarmament; and conversion of military production and structures.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presented to the General Assembly last year a report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". It sketches timely guidelines for discussion of new opportunities and challenges of disarmament. Finland shares the view that now is the right moment to update the present multilateral disarmament agenda and machinery. Disarmament should be seen in a wider context of international peace and security. As elements of this wider system, crisis management, peace-making and peace-keeping have gained new importance. The role of the United Nations in these processes is being adjusted to the new realities. It is vital for the security of all Member States that the United Nations is ready to act in accordance with its Charter in cases of any threat to peace or act of aggression. The observance of multilateral disarmament agreements is directly relevant to international peace and security.

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Global disarmament efforts and regional efforts are mutually reinforcing. In Europe, the commitments within the CSCE framework have been of the utmost importance in consolidating confidence and achieving disarmament. These steps naturally have a larger significance to global peace and security. The concept of integration, globalization and revitalization are useful tools when one aims at enhanced efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control. Now these concepts should be transferred to the operational level. We hope that meaningful results in the review of the multilateral disarmament machinery will be achieved in the resumed session of the First Committee.

The immense changes have not diminished the need for disarmament. On the contrary, fresh possibilities have been opened. Remarkable arms control achievements have been recorded during the past few years. Further reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals were codified in the START II Treaty. Now we are waiting for rapid process towards the full implementation of the START commitments. Finland welcomes the ratification of the START I Treaty and the accession to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty by Belarus. We urge Ukraine to take similar action without delay, and we also urge Kazakhstan to fulfil its commitment to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear State.

The nuclear testing moratoria followed by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States open new prospects for arms control. We urge all nuclear-weapon States to suspend their testing activities. The geographical proximity of the Novaya Zemlya testing area to Finland gives special emphasis to our interest to see testing discontinued and banned.

The chemical weapons Convention has been completed and opened for signature. The Convention is well on its way towards universal adherence - we hope that the remaining obstacles to this can be lifted. Negotiations on the Convention strongly dominated the work of the CD for years. With it, one phase of the CD is over. The CD is at a turning-point now.

The agenda, composition and methods of work of the CD must be geared to meet the new challenges. The Conference must look forward. Finland supports the view that the role of the CD as the single negotiating forum of global character should be maintained. The agenda of the Conference should be focused and compact. We welcome the decision of the Conference to concentrate this year on the four items which are widely seen as having high priority. This pragmatic approach could serve as a model also for the future.

I wish to outline briefly certain issues which, in our view, are priorities for multilateral arms control and disarmament during the coming years. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as conventional armaments is a major concern of the international community during the coming years. Growing proliferation risks call for rigorous implementation of the existing international instruments. After the chemical weapons Convention is in place, the legal basis to prevent the spread of all weapons of mass destruction is in existence. Supplier controls are also a necessary element of non-proliferation efforts now and in the future. Finland

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adheres to and fully supports the aims and activities of the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines. With regard to the biological weapons Convention, discussions of the governmental experts on possible verification measures have been encouraging.

The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is a solid basis for curbing nuclear proliferation. It is approaching universality. It should not be endangered. Finland supports the extension of the Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally in the 1995 Conference. As an essential element of the existing regime, the implementation mechanisms should be enhanced. Full-scope safeguards should be required for nuclear exports. The effective implementation of the on-site inspection capability of IAEA is essential. This is, indeed, a topical issue today. Finland welcomes the latest nuclear non-proliferation commitments by several countries. Efforts should be continued to get also those on board who still remain outside.

Moreover, the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes would significantly contribute to non-proliferation efforts.

The nuclear-test-ban issue is one of the four priority areas in which the CD has agreed to start work. The CD is the most appropriate body to deal with this global issue. We hope that the time is ripe to proceed towards a comprehensive test ban. Recent developments have certainly raised new expectations.

Transparency in armaments is another item on the agenda, which is gaining importance. The acquisition and destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons in areas of regional conflict is a threat of such magnitude that it worries all of us. We note that the need for confidence-building is recognized in the peace processes both in the case of the Middle East and the former Yugoslavia. The benefits of increased transparency and openness are obvious. We agree with those who say that confidence-building measures cannot replace reductions. Yet they do help in preventing undue suspicion and misunderstandings. And they pave the way for disarmament measures. We are convinced that it is possible to be much more open, much more transparent, without endangering the vital and legitimate security interests of anyone. Our experience of the extensive commitments within regional cooperation in the European context is that the assets far exceed the liabilities for all those who are participating in this cooperation.

The establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms opens up new prospects which we should try to utilize. Finland will give its data by the established date and we expect others to do likewise.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments should consider new possibilities to strengthen transparency through measures of a confidence-building character. We would like to think in terms of building up - through concrete measures - a framework which could support

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regional efforts. This framework could contain universal measures promoting transparency and openness. As part of this framework, the Register of Conventional Arms is already there. There is also the standardized reporting system for military expenditure. New measures for the exchange of military data could be developed, perhaps more focused measures. This item would be an appropriate context for dialogue on universal norms or guidelines for international transfers of high technology with military applications, on identification of offensive characteristics of military forces or on measures serving for early-warning purposes.

We have noticed that several delegations would like to give priority to the question of the composition of the CD over the review of the agenda. This, we think, is a fair procedure. The Conference negotiates for all of us. The very nature of many of the new concerns calls for wider participation of the international community. There is nothing to win, and much to lose, by closing the doors.

The argument that the negotiations would be hampered by a larger number of participants is not unknown to us. We do not believe in it. Many observer States participated actively in the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention. I believe that it is unanimously recognized that they gave a useful input. The growing number of observer States during the negotiations had no adverse effects on the complexity of the negotiating process.

All those who apply for membership and demonstrate willingness to contribute to the work of the CD should be eligible to join the CD. By this we are not saying that anyone could walk in at any time. The composition should be reviewed at some intervals, for instance every five years, as suggested by the United Kingdom. On the other hand, at the time of the review, the enlargement should not be fixed in numbers. Our view is that it would be useful to complement this with the possibility to participate in the work of the Conference as an observer also in the future.

We understand that any solution on extension must be acceptable to all the members. But we would rather not like to speak in terms of balance. What is the balance we are looking for? The present composition is based on the balance of the past. Should we establish a new balance? With the consensus rule - which we would like to maintain - it is not really possible to impose solutions on anyone. In order to reach consensus, everyone will have to compromise. But the end result is never a mathematical equation. I do not believe that this would much change in a larger CD. In our opinion, an issue-oriented Conference - without any artificial balance calculations - would best serve the interests of everyone.

Finland has formally been a candidate for the CD since 1982 and we have contributed actively to the work of the CD as an observer. We reiterate our interest to become a member as soon as possible. So far, the review of the membership, agenda and the working methods of the CD has proceeded in an open and transparent manner. The constructive spirit is another sign of the change of atmosphere. We all benefit from this change. I trust that the work under the guidance of the special coordinators will be fruitful.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

Before I give the floor to the next speaker on my list, Ambassador Vaerno of Norway, I should like to welcome warmly in the Conference the Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly, His Excellency Ambassador Elaraby, who is in Geneva to conduct consultations on important questions relating to the work of that Conference. I wish him every success in his important mission.

I now give the floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Vaerno.

Mr. VAERNO (Norway): Mr. President, let me first of all congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. Your guidance, as indicated by your very important introductory statement, will be of great assistance in this period where the Conference on Disarmament has an in-depth discussion of its future structure and agenda. I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Amorim of Brazil and Ambassador Servais of Belgium for their able conduct of the inter-sessional soliciting of views of members and observers alike regarding the same matter. My delegation is also grateful to Ambassador Berasategui and his staff for advice and assistance on many occasions.

I have asked for the floor today mainly to address the Norwegian view on the ongoing consultation regarding the future structure and agenda of the Conference; other representatives of my country will follow up with more in-depth statements at a later time. The Conference on Disarmament represents the sole negotiating body for global disarmament issues. There is a need to maintain the Conference as a forum for real negotiations. After a few words on the possible extension of the Conference, here I would like to also refer to my esteemed colleague Ambassador Blomberg. At present more than 20 countries have applied for membership in the Conference on Disarmament. Norway is among the applicants, and has since 1986 been the endorsed Western candidate for membership. We have for several years actively participated in an observer capacity in the work of the Conference and we thus feel like Finland that we all, as observers, have contributed substantially to the negotiations. In connection with the preparation of the chemical weapons Convention, Norway submitted to the CD on a regular basis technical studies on verification of possible use of chemical weapons. Norwegian experts are also taking an active part in the efforts of the CD's Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to design and test a global seismic network which could monitor a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

We are aware of the different proposals that have been put forward to incorporate new members. Norway supports the idea to accept as members those States which have applied and have shown and demonstrated a genuine interest in the work of the Conference. An expansion of the membership in the Conference will we think vitalize and bring new ideas to the Conference. Expanding the membership should also broaden the political basis for the

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negotiations and thus enable the Conference to benefit from experiences and contributions of a larger group of nations. It is our impression that the effort to enlarge the Conference is now gaining momentum. A decision to this effect should be implemented without further delay. In this respect we look forward to the conclusions and recommendations by Ambassador O'Sullivan and Ambassador Marín Bosch on this question after their extensive consultations.

Norway has studied with great interest the Secretary-General's report on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", and we will take an active part in the deliberations during the resumed session of the First Committee next month. Norway's view on the report and in particular the question of the multilateral disarmament machinery has already been submitted to the Secretary-General as a background paper to the resumed session.

The end of the cold war era, with the emerging international consensus on vital security issues, should make it possible to make further breakthroughs on priority items on the international disarmament agenda. Disarmament should in the long run provide the basis for lower expenditure and help reallocate resources for sustainable development. The threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is very real. Much attention needs to be paid to verification and control of existing agreements. In this respect the chemical weapons Convention has established a new standard which could be exploited for other areas of disarmament, and much of the expertise in this field rests within the Conference.

We have noted with pleasure that the Conference has established an agenda for 1993, focusing on various important issues such as the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and transparency in armaments. This provides a good basis for meaningful work in the 1993 session. As is well known, Norway attaches particular importance to the issue of a nuclear test ban. This matter was emphasized by the Norwegian State Secretary Mrs. Helga Hernes when she addressed the Conference in June last year. Norway will continue to participate actively in the elaboration of a verification regime for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) has since its establishment in 1968 played a key role in this regard. After the successful completion of the chemical weapons Convention, the test ban issue should assume top priority. In this regard Norway welcomes the unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing by France, the Russian Federation and the United States. Now we have an historic opportunity for such a comprehensive test-ban treaty. One prerequisite for such a treaty is that none of the nuclear-weapon States resume their testing. We hope that these moratoria will be continued. Lack of substantial progress on the test-ban issue before the 1995 conference of the non-proliferation Treaty might have negative consequences for the extension of the duration of the Treaty. Norway favours an indefinite extension of the NPT.

The general and long-term aim of bringing down the levels of armaments and building confidence through legally binding disarmament instruments on a

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regional as well as global basis will be a vital element in the security equation of States in the future. This aim is not achieved overnight, but takes plodding and painstaking efforts by dedicated negotiators and experts over extended periods. The Conference on Disarmament has a vital role to play in this regard. The task of the Conference in the years ahead should be to contribute substantially to further progress in the disarmament field. Norway wants to take an active part in this work within the Conference as a full member.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Boytha.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): Mr. President, as this is the first time I take the floor under the tenure of your presidency, allow me first of all to congratulate you on your assumption of this high post. I am convinced that your well-known diplomatic skills and familiarity with the issues on the agenda of the Conference provide us with a firm basis for smooth work in the coming weeks. I also commend your predecessors, Ambassador Amorim of Brazil and Ambassador Servais of Belgium, for their leadership during the traditionally complex and difficult deliberations of the opening stages.

It is an honour and pleasure for me to address the Conference on Disarmament, especially at a juncture where the future of this important multilateral body is under comprehensive discussion. On this occasion my delegation would like to share its views with the distinguished participants on some of the pertaining issues. I would like to do this in conjunction with the report of the United Nations Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" and the relevant draft response of the Conference. The latter was formulated as a result of a series of informal consultations conducted under the able guidance of your predecessor, Ambassador Amorim of Brazil, and in which I myself also had the privilege to participate.

The multilateral disarmament machinery is an integral part of the indivisible system of international security and so cannot be examined independently. It is thus clear that the functioning of this machinery should be continuously adapted to the changing needs and new challenges of the international security environment. The requirements determining the functioning of the multilateral disarmament machinery have changed profoundly in past years. With the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention the approach of elaborating traditional, comprehensive and large-scale disarmament treaties will gradually evolve into seeking disarmament agreements with a more limited but clearly defined scope. The future of the different organs of the multilateral disarmament machinery will largely depend on the ability of these bodies to address the new and urgent challenges in a novel way and to rid themselves of the shackles and confines self-imposed in the cold war era. Steps towards reform have already been taken by the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission. The Conference on Disarmament has also embarked on a process of self-examination through internal debate, but this will soon have to be translated into concrete deeds.

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

In the existing international situation consideration of measures aiming to prevent armed conflicts must be high on the security agenda. Among the many tools of preventive international policy, those of arms control and disarmament could also be applied specifically. The multilateral disarmament machinery has a major role to play here. The elaboration of confidence-building measures, increased transparency coupled with an early-warning system of excessive arms build-ups, prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and sharing the experience gained in regional disarmament measures can all be considered in this context. Enhancing the compliance regimes of existing multilateral disarmament agreements, expanding verification possibilities is also a major issue which - especially after the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention - can be addressed without the political reservations characteristic of the past. Besides the nuclear items that dominated the agenda so far, questions related to conventional weapons must also be dealt with. This does not mean, however, that nuclear issues are no longer among the priority items. Rather, it implies an easing of the former exclusiveness of these items to the benefit of other, hardly less compelling disarmament issues. In fact the draft response of the Conference on Disarmament to the report of the United Nations Secretary-General contains informally agreed elements which reflect this very realization.

The conceptual elements formulated in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General are actual tendencies in a changing international environment. The relevance of integration, globalization and revitalization is beyond doubt. In fact, these ideas represent the only viable orientation for enhancing efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament. The concept of integration outlined in the Secretary-General's report underlines the recent recognition of the requirement that international security must not be conceived exclusively as an equation of military variables and parameters. Security involves a host of other, non-military issues the significance of which has not been sufficiently considered for years.

Besides the political and economic elements referred to in the report of the Secretary-General, related questions of the environment come more and more into play in assessing the security of States. In the aftermath of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, questions concerning the environment have to be addressed in a different manner. Hungary, with its geographical location and with a small but densely populated territory, is rather vulnerable in terms of environmental security. Arms control issues related to the environment are partially covered by the ENMOD Convention, but the recent review of that legal instrument aptly demonstrated the shortcomings inherent in the Convention. Although this subject does not belong to the strict domain of multilateral disarmament, the overall machinery of international security should find a way to address environmental issues in an appropriate manner. The objective should be the prevention of activities affecting the environment in a way that can have a bearing on the environmental stability and living conditions of another State, in other words on its environmental security.

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

The Conference on Disarmament, while conducting intensive consultations on the reform of its activities, has already given some indications of priorities in its programme of work adopted at the beginning of this year's session. I would like to commend the Conference for its ability to start the 1993 session in an expeditious manner and to establish ad hoc committees on four important issues. Let me also underline the significance we attach to the continuation of informal consultations on non-proliferation in all its aspects, especially against the background of the upcoming review of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and the contemporaneous decision to be taken on its - hopefully unlimited - extension. My delegation intends to address this issue in detail at a later stage.

In trying to look for well-defined items for the working agenda of the Conference, the United Nations Secretary-General hinted at the possibility of expanding the role of the CD to supervise existing multilateral disarmament and arms regulation agreements. While we are perfectly aware of the opposition voiced by several delegations in this regard, we still see some merit in considering and perhaps further developing the idea. It is true that assuming such a responsibility would pose difficulties. Yet we do not see a problem if the aspect of supervision is understood as meaning the elaboration of specific verification regimes for existing disarmament conventions that lack such a system. It is the biological and toxin weapons Convention that gives the best example here. The Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures for the BWC from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint has embarked on a major task in this field. The technical examination of potential verification measures to be completed later this year might lead to the conclusion that it is worthwhile to integrate the potential measures into a verification regime. Should the States parties to the BWC generally adopt this position, consideration could also be given to requesting the Conference on Disarmament to work in this direction.

The creation of comprehensive and global systems of transparency in armaments is certainly an area with great potential. The establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is a first step which will prove its efficiency and usefulness once the required inputs from the United Nations Member States are provided. The Conference on Disarmament itself started dealing with the issue of transparency a year ago, and this year a subsidiary body was set up to provide a framework for further consideration. We believe that on the basis of principles on objective information on military matters, adopted by consensus at last year's UNDC session, we could explore the possible fields of future activity for the Conference. In our view, one of the follow-on steps could be the examination of possible structures for the assessment of data provided in the framework of the transparency systems, and for the signalling of arms build-ups incompatible with legitimate security needs. The elaboration of guidelines and criteria for such structures could be one of the future tasks of the Conference.

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

As it is also mentioned in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General, regional approaches to security and disarmament are gaining increased importance. Armed conflicts in the past years have all had a regional character, but in the bipolar world of the cold war, they could not be addressed appropriately. One way to prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts could be the elaboration and implementation of different confidence-building measures. In working out such measures, the nature and generating causes of armed conflicts, the characteristics of given regions and possible previous regional experience in confidence-building should equally be taken into account. These collateral measures, as they are called in the Decalogue of the Conference on Disarmament, have been very much neglected in the past and the Conference could do a lot in making up for this negligence. We are encouraged by the fact that the draft response of the CD to the report of the United Nations Secretary-General has already recognized the importance of regional approaches to arms control and disarmament.

From what I have said so far it must be clear that my country invariably attaches great significance to the role of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of multilateral disarmament also in a changing international situation. In this regard the reaffirmation of the rule of consensus of the Conference cannot be over-estimated, especially in the light of the expansion of this body we appear to be heading for.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Goonetilleke.

Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, permit me at the outset to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. I wish you every success and assure you of my delegation's full cooperation in the accomplishment of your responsibilities. I would also like to express our gratitude to your predecessors Ambassador Amorim of Brazil and Ambassador Servais of Belgium for their valuable contribution and for the excellent manner in which they guided the work of the Conference. Our sincere appreciation also goes to Ambassador Berasategui, Secretary-General of the Conference, and his efficient bureau for their continued and dedicated service. May I also take this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues from Germany, Hungary, India, Kenya and Sweden?

With the dawning of 1993, stimulated by new international realities as well as painstakingly long-drawn-out multilateral efforts, there have been unprecedented forward movements in the disarmament endeavours. The signing of START II by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation as well as the CWC by over 130 States are the two events that have given rise to renewed optimism. My delegation is thankful to the distinguished Ambassador of the United States for making a joint statement on behalf of his country and the Russian Federation presenting START II in a nutshell. We are also grateful to the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation for his important statement with special reference to START II. We earnestly hope all other republics involved will hasten to take necessary measures towards the

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

ratification of START II and accede to the NPT soon. We are also encouraged to note that START II will eventually effect deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. In this context, I wish to recall what the Secretary-General has said regarding the far-reaching disarmament agreements and the increased mutual trust between the two major military Powers in his report on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". We cannot but agree with the Secretary-General that the steps taken by these two States to undertake profound nuclear disarmament measures should not be confined to the exclusive domains of the two nations, and that we must strive to create conditions in other regions to undertake similar commitments.

The Secretary-General has also rightly referred to the institution of confidence-building as an important element of the evolving international security system. In this respect my delegation is gratified to note the statement recently made by my colleague Ambassador Chandra of India, presenting a brief account of the initiatives taken by his country and Pakistan, both Sri Lanka's close and friendly neighbours, towards confidence-building measures. We are encouraged by these cooperative endeavours.

All unilateral and bilateral disarmament approaches are constructive and should be commended. However, my delegation wishes to maintain that they cannot replace multilateral disarmament endeavours. In any event, there is no substitute for multilateral mechanisms when it comes to the question of measures for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly the most destabilizing and devastating of all, the nuclear arsenals. In this regard the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum should continue to accord the highest priority to the conclusion of appropriate effective international instruments to totally eliminate nuclear weapons and all nuclear-related military activities. It is on this same reasoning that the Conference on Disarmament and the institutions preceding it arduously worked and concluded international instruments such as the NPT, BWC and recently the CWC. The successful conclusion of the CWC not only symbolizes the effectiveness of the CD, but also demonstrates the collective determination of the United Nations, which remained until the conclusive stage of the CWC the CD's principal source of inspiration, wisdom and strength.

We agree with the opinion of the Secretary-General that a comprehensive approach is needed to address the structure, functions, methods of work and working agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Such a comprehensive approach should necessarily be directed towards further strengthening the negotiating role and the multilateral character of the Conference on Disarmament. In this context the existing mechanisms, namely the informal open-ended consultations aimed at the improved and effective functioning of the Conference and the recently appointed special coordinators on the question of the membership and the agenda, are competent to contribute towards practical actions for the rationalization of the CD's work. In our view such practical actions should particularly clear obstacles or barriers within

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

existing mechanisms and approaches to enable the Conference to deal with substantive issues before it in a rationally prioritized and concrete manner. In the view of the Secretary-General, "efforts of the CD might be focused on well-defined and urgent issues". There are no issues that are more urgent than the issues related to nuclear weapons. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons remains the common and ultimate objective of half a dozen items on our customary agenda. We realize the complexity of these issues. But adoption of effective international measures to rid the world of nuclear arsenals will not be an impossible task, provided the political will that was abundantly manifested during the negotiations on the draft CWC could be duplicated.

As for the understanding reached regarding the commencement of the work of the Conference in 1993, it is the hope of my delegation that when the agenda is subject to further review, the other items pertaining to nuclear issues, namely items 2 and 3 of last year's agenda, will be accorded equal status along with the four items on which ad hoc committees have now been established. These two items, both dealing with nuclear matters, are far too important to be sidelined.

One of the priority objectives of this Conference my delegation supports is the need for an effective treaty to outlaw all nuclear test explosions. In this field there have been a few encouraging developments, including voluntary observance of nuclear test moratoria by major nuclear Powers and a downward trend in the number of tests carried out since 1987. It is also heartening to note that all major nuclear Powers, with the exception of two new republics of the former Soviet Union, have eventually become parties to the NPT. Despite all these positive trends, the potential for nuclear proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, will continue to exist as long as tests for new qualitative improvements and new types of nuclear weapons are not completely discontinued. In this regard, it should be emphasized that it is neither rational nor reasonable for the non-nuclear-weapon States to rely solely - I repeat, to rely solely - on the good will of the nuclear-weapon States, which is implicitly manifest in their self-declared moratoria. One of the most effective international measures to prevent further proliferation still remains a legally binding ban on nuclear test explosions through a verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Conference should now seize the opportunity to commence substantive negotiations in this direction.

Another issue of paramount importance, particularly to all non-nuclear-weapon States, is the need for effective international arrangements to assure them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Despite the end of the cold war and the improved relationship between the major military Powers, it is regrettable there has been no progress on measures to provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation hopes that the Conference having endorsed the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances for this year, will live up to the expectations of the United Nations General Assembly which are duly reflected in its resolution 47/50.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

With the unprecedented advances in high technology, particularly in qualitative refinements in weapons precision, outer space is becoming an environment increasingly vulnerable to militarization. The existing international instruments have so far failed to reverse this dangerous trend due to their inherent loopholes. The need for urgent action by the CD to prevent an arms race in outer space is therefore not only timely, but also essential to ensure the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. In this regard it is important that the CD continues building upon areas of convergence with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, as has been requested in General Assembly resolution 47/51. The present international climate is conducive to concrete measures in that direction. My delegation therefore hopes that all States, particularly the major Powers with space capabilities, will contribute actively to achieving the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space when the Ad Hoc Committee re-established this year proceeds with its work.

During the last year, the members of the Conference held many rounds of informal consultations under the able and skilful stewardship of Ambassador Zahran of Egypt on the item "Transparency in armaments". The informal consultations which provoked a wide range of views and observations on different aspects of TIA eventually facilitated action by the Conference to include the issue as an agenda item to continue its future work on it. The resolution adopted by the forty-seventh United Nations General Assembly encourages the Conference to address the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, including military holdings and procurement through national production, and to elaborate universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency in this field.

In the view of my delegation, transparency in armaments, being a part of the global disarmament process, should essentially be non-discriminatory and comprehensive. Sri Lanka wishes to particularly emphasize the need for equal and balanced rights and responsibilities of States participating in any transparency regime, bearing in mind that such a monitoring regime will not adversely affect the legitimate internal defence procurement of a nation. Any transparency regime envisaged should also incorporate a wide range of other important elements to strengthen and intensify efforts for the expansion of the scope of the arms register which was established in January 1992 in New York. Particularly, it is important that the expansion of the scope of the subject of openness and transparency should include military holdings and procurement through national production as well as production of conventional weapons, transfers of high technology with military applications and weapons of mass destruction as well. Such an expanded United Nations register will help reduce its present discriminatory aspects.

It is also important to bear in mind that one of the main sources of instability and insecurity affecting the smaller countries is the illicit arms

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

trade which continues to sustain a vicious cycle of terrorism, drug trafficking and arms smuggling. At a time when nations are forthcoming to scale down their armament inventories, it is regrettable that the international community has not yet even made an attempt to ascertain the magnitude of the illicit arms trade involving various irregular groups which indulge in violent activities against democratic societies. Therefore, any monitoring regime should necessarily address the destabilizing effects of the illicit arms trade with a view to putting an end to such activities.

The composition of the CD as presently constituted has been the subject of discussion for some time. It has been generally acknowledged that in keeping with the new developments in the international arena, the membership of the Conference needs to be expanded. The Conference on Disarmament, being the sole multilateral negotiating body, should not be a closed-door club, as matters dealt with by this body affect the security interests of all nations. Furthermore, it is undemocratic to prevent those who have a deep interest in the subject from taking part in the work of the Conference. My delegation is therefore of the view that the CD should be made more representative and is prepared to actively cooperate with the special coordinator who is now charged with the task of concluding consultations on the issue of membership.

My delegation welcomes the decision of the Conference to continue the ongoing open-ended consultation on non-proliferation in all its aspects, in an informal setting, which in our view will no doubt stimulate constructive dialogues and result in producing tangible inputs that can be made use of in relevant forums.

As we progress towards the NPT review conference in 1995, several genuine questions come to our mind. What would the United States and the Russian Federation intend doing with more than 8,000 nuclear warheads they will have between them after the year 2003? Against whom will these, and the weapons in the hands of other nuclear-weapon States be used? How secure and safe will future generations be with so many nuclear warheads in the hands of those two countries and others? Will the present nuclear-weapon States be more responsible with those weapons in their arsenals than the others who may have crossed the threshold since 1970? What kind of new strategic doctrines will be put forward to justify the continued possession of nuclear weapons, the continuation of new tests and research, and the development or invention of new types of weapon? What kind of incentives will there be for the threshold countries to become parties to the NPT, if the nuclear-weapon States continue testing, developing and stockpiling more sophisticated nuclear weapons beyond the year 2003?

On 25 December 1991, with the demise of the USSR the number of States possessing nuclear weapons jumped from five to eight. This excludes several countries that crossed the threshold some time back despite the NPT. These developments themselves are clear examples of how flawed the NPT had been to begin with. Nevertheless States like mine faithfully adhere to the NPT, with a firm commitment to the cause of world peace and with a genuine desire to see the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. As the heads of State reiterated

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

at the tenth summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, the failure by major nuclear Powers to demonstrate a genuine commitment with regard to complete nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework under article VI of the NPT will remain a matter of concern for the international community, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States.

It may be true that what was invented cannot be disinvented. Nevertheless, we can at least be true to our conscience and make an attempt to unlearn what we have learned in negotiations willingly or unwillingly, to devise loopholes to advance legalistic interpretations such as "what is not prohibited is permitted". In other words, multilateral disarmament negotiations should not end up in the form of vehicles of convenience with a licence to continue the very activities that we are striving hard to put an end to. Is it not ironic that those who now seek the indefinite extension of the NPT have themselves in the past engaged in a race to add to their arsenals tens of thousands of nuclear warheads after signing the NPT? Is it not time for the States parties to the NPT to ask themselves what they have achieved over the last 23 years and what will they achieve at least from now and 1995 if we are to consider an indefinite extension of the Treaty? In this background, when the Treaty comes up for extension in 1995, our priority should be to examine whether the nuclear-weapon States as well as the non-nuclear-weapon States had adhered to the Treaty both in spirit and letter, and what progress we have made on the road to achieve nuclear disarmament in terms of article VI of the NPT. Based on the final assessment, a decision may be taken regarding the future of the NPT in terms of article X of the Treaty.

In an imperfect world such as ours, nothing can be perfect. The world we know has always been divided between "haves" and "have-nots". It may be naive on our part to expect the world not to be divided in this manner. Yet nobody can blame us for trying hard at least to narrow the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, as this is my first intervention in the Conference on Disarmament this session, I would like to express my full support, as well as that of my delegation, to you in carrying out your duties of presiding over the work of this body. I would also like to associate myself with all the warm wishes of welcome already extended to those heads of delegation - our new colleagues - who have recently joined us. I would, as well, wish to commend the exemplary work of your predecessor, Ambassador Amorim of Brazil, who was able to put the right process in motion to ensure this session could be productive.

The Canadian Government has already forwarded to the Secretary-General our views on his report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". Rather than take up time by reading out those views in full, I have asked that a copy be given to all delegations and I hope it will prove to be of some interest to you.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

In his report to the General Assembly, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali explored the themes of "integration", "globalization", and "revitalization". Today, I would like to focus on my Government's views on how these themes should govern our work in this body. The Secretary-General stated that it was his strong feeling that the time had come for the practical integration of disarmament and arms regulation issues into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda. One of the practical ways to begin to achieve this goal is through enhanced linkage of this forum with the UNDC.

As we all know, as a deliberative body, one of the functions of the UNDC has been to prepare the groundwork for the Conference on Disarmament through the development of principles as well as providing, at least potentially, a degree of focus for the CD agenda. In Canada we believe the need to make it easier for the UNDC and the Conference on Disarmament to work together for the achievement of our objectives and to ensure that future UNDC deliberations become even more relevant and results-oriented. We think that closer cooperation and some mechanism for linkage or dialogue is therefore required in the short term, if the UNDC and the CD are to remain relevant in the rapidly changing ACD environment. In the longer term, when there has been an expansion of the CD's membership, and membership of the two bodies is more broadly shared, we should be prepared to combine the two into one global peace and security forum in which both a security dialogue and arms control negotiations at a global and regional level can be carried out. In the immediate term, however, we believe that our work in this body would be enhanced if, for example, the UNDC could pass worthy ideas directly to us, without first having to go through the First Committee. In other words, a greater degree of cross-fertilization could be useful.

We are also pleased that at this session the issues of our agenda and membership are being handled in a pragmatic way through the appointment and the ongoing activities, of the two special coordinators, our colleagues Ambassadors Marín Bosch and O'Sullivan. Pursuing the theme of globalization, the Secretary-General noted that it is vital that all States be engaged in the process of disarmament and that they give practical content to their declared intent. We strongly support this approach. We believe that those who have requested to join the Conference on Disarmament should be welcomed as full members immediately. The overriding principle which guides us on the membership question is that the resulting CD have a broader participation but still be of a manageable size and thus able to work effectively. I know, however, that this is a difficult issue on which opinion is divided and I wish Ambassador O'Sullivan well in his efforts to resolve it.

Finally, the theme of revitalization. We must build upon our past achievements. For the past six months we have sensed a new confidence in this group that results from the successful conclusion of the negotiation of the chemical weapons Convention and we can praise, with justification and without exaggeration, the remarkable progress that has been achieved in reducing the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States of America. But time moves

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

on and we are now presented with a chance to make further progress on the arms control agenda, namely, the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We have moved quickly here to establish a working group on negotiating a nuclear test ban. Currently three nuclear-weapon States have declared testing moratoria. The Foreign Minister of France has proposed that representatives of the five nuclear-weapon States meet to consider how to advance this issue. These are all positive steps, but we need a clear signal from the five that they are prepared now to negotiate a test-ban treaty. One thing is clear: the immobilism of the cold war is over. The world community is no longer prepared to watch the CD engage in endless debate over the minutiae of a test ban as it was during the 20 years of the chemical weapons negotiations. We must begin negotiations immediately and we should aim to complete them by the summer of 1995.

The chemical weapons Convention is now behind us and, last week in The Hague, the essential preliminary steps for the establishment of the provisional secretariat were taken. Those who were involved with the CWC negotiations over the years will, however, recall that in the past Canada has prepared and distributed to the Conference on Disarmament and the secretariat collections of working papers from the CWC Ad Hoc Committee. Those for the 1991 session are finally ready for distribution to you for the record. Together with the compilation of 1991 CWC working papers we will also distribute a booklet entitled "The chemical weapons Convention and the control of scheduled chemicals in Canada" which, we hope, will be of practical use, especially to those signatories of the CWC which are now beginning to prepare to implement those regimes and obligations that membership will eventually entail.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I take pleasure in informing you that my Government has also asked the secretariat to distribute to you another publication, on arms control verification. It is an updated version of a previously supplied bibliography of verification publications from governments and other institutions. Copies of this update were earlier made available to First Committee delegates in the autumn, but CD delegations and observers may also find it of use.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? This does not seem to be the case.

May I invite the Conference to turn now to the draft reports which have been the subject of consideration for the past two weeks? May I express once more to Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil our deep appreciation for his skilful leadership in the process of the elaboration of these texts? The first draft report on "New dimensions" is contained in document CD/WP.441. The second report on the ongoing review of the agenda, composition and methods of work of the Conference appears in document CD/WP.442. At the last meeting of coordinators, we agreed to incorporate some changes in the first report

(The President)

which I hope will ensure consensus on its contents. In connection with this report, contained in CD/WP.441, there is only a minor editorial change to be made in paragraph 3, where in transcribing the full titles for various agreements one was inadvertently omitted. Accordingly, in the list of agreements between brackets we should add, after the first one, "Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms". The secretariat will proceed to incorporate this addition.

The second report contains the addition of three paragraphs which reflect the efforts made by the special coordinators on the agenda and composition of the Conference. I am informed that these additions are acceptable.

During the Presidential consultations held yesterday, it was agreed that the reports would be transmitted with a letter from the President of the Conference to the Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly, which would be merely procedural and would incorporate a sentence which would read as follows: "A large number of States participating in the work of the Conference have individually stated their national views on the report of the Secretary-General, which are reflected in the records of the Conference, as follows: CD/PV ..." (with references to the numbers of the plenary meetings at which the statements were made).

I am informed by the secretariat that the translations of the reports are being made in all official languages and the texts will be available on Monday, 22 February, at noon. Any corrections in the various languages should be transmitted to the secretariat which, following existing practice, will proceed to incorporate them. If the corrections involve matters of substance, the secretariat will consult me and the matter will be discussed at an informal meeting. I trust that this arrangement, which has been followed on other occasions, is acceptable.

I shall now proceed to put before the Conference for action the two draft reports. I recognize the distinguished representative of Cuba.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): First and foremost, allow me to convey to you, Mr. President, the satisfaction of the delegation of Cuba at seeing you presiding over our work. We are sure that you will fulfil the task before you with success. We should also like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude once more to your predecessor in that post for the way in which he discharged his functions, and particularly for his efforts in trying to find a satisfactory solution for the Conference's response to the Secretary-General's report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". Before you proceed, I should like to call your attention to paragraph 13 on page 3 of document CD/WP.441 and ask through you for some clarification. I wonder whether in the second line of this paragraph where in English it speaks of "arms limitation and disarmament" it would not be better for the sake of consistency with the remainder of the text to say "arms regulation and disarmament".

The PRESIDENT: I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for her suggestion and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I recognize the distinguished representative of France - I suppose it is on this point.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Allow me also to congratulate you, Mr. President, and to express our satisfaction at seeing you preside over our work at an important time. Knowing your skill, we are sure that our work is in safe hands, and, in that connection, like previous speakers, I should like to reiterate our great appreciation and admiration for Ambassador Amorim, who guided our work in such a brilliant fashion to the results we now have before us.

Turning to the point raised by the delegation of Cuba, I just wanted to say something because this sentence represents a proposal which was suggested by our delegation during the informal consultations on this subject. The reason why the terms used in this sentence are what they are is simple. The sentence is taken from a United Nations resolution, and during the consultations it was the subject of discussions between interested delegations, the question being whether any of the terms used should be amended to bring them more into line with the concerns of certain delegations, or whether, on the contrary, it was preferable to keep the sentence as a whole without any modification, just as it stood in the United Nations General Assembly resolution itself. After a lengthy discussion it was considered preferable to keep the sentence verbatim, without change, and that is why we find these words used here. I think that, as far as we are concerned at any rate, we should not want to go back and change the words, which, once again, had been the subject of particularly difficult discussions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. We have heard the point the distinguished Ambassador of France has made with respect to the proposal advanced by our distinguished colleague from Cuba. It relates to paragraph 13, the second sentence, which, like the rest of the text, is the result of painful negotiations, leading to the very delicate balance incorporated in this document. I wonder whether in the light of the explanation we have heard by the representative of France, our colleague from Cuba would insist on incorporating the change. We now know that this language comes from a General Assembly resolution, and perhaps it might be difficult, at this late stage, to negotiate again the language of paragraph 13. But I am in the hands of the Conference, and I appeal to our colleague to consider perhaps retaining the text. Cuba has the floor.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba): Let me set your mind at rest straight away. It is not my delegation's intention to reopen any discussion here. It is just that throughout the text the form of words we are using is "disarmament and arms regulation", which also is a term that appears in official documents of the United Nations. I would stress that, although it is true that "arms limitation" is used in various General Assembly resolutions, it is no less

(Mrs. Bauta Solés, Cuba)

true that the term used in the Charter of the United Nations is not "arms limitation", but "arms regulation", and since my delegation saw that throughout the text the reference was to what appeared in the United Nations Charter, it was a little surprised to see this phrase here in paragraph 13. Having said that, I wish to repeat that we are not going to press for any change, but it should be noted that paragraph 13 is not an exact quotation from any resolution.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for this statement. However useful this is, I suppose that the picture is clearer now. I am very grateful to our colleague from Cuba for the approach she has decided to follow in this respect. We recognize the concern, and certainly any future refinement of material dealing with this subject would perhaps take this into account. Again, thank you very much for your understanding, and I now intend to proceed to put before the Conference for action the two reports.

First, we shall take a decision on document CD/WP.441, entitled "Draft report of the Conference on Disarmament on the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled 'New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era'". If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now proceed to the second report, which is contained in document CD/WP.442, entitled "Draft report of the Conference on Disarmament on the ongoing review of the agenda, composition and methods of work of the Conference". If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I recognize the distinguished representative of China.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, I would like to add my voice to the congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that under your guidance we will achieve new results in our work. My delegation would also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Amorim of Brazil, for his efforts and contributions during his tenure as President of the CD.

We have just adopted in the plenary documents CD/WP.441 and CD/WP.442. In general, they essentially reflect the consensus of the member States of the CD. My delegation has joined in the consensus on these documents. At the same time, like other delegations, my delegation also feels that these documents are by no means perfect. For instance, document CD/WP.441 contains certain words and phrases which are marred by imbalance. The formulation "disarmament is a collective responsibility" which is found in both paragraphs 8 and 11 of that document is too simplified as well as inaccurate

(Mr. Hou, China)

and insufficiently comprehensive. Obviously, that formulation is at variance with the formulations found in a series of important documents and resolutions adopted by consensus at the General Assembly and the SSOD. China has on many occasions in the past fully explained its position of principle on this matter; on this occasion I wish to reiterate that my country still maintains that position of principle on this matter and on the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly. In accordance with rule 25 of the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament, my delegation hopes that the above statement and position of principle will be put on the record and will be reflected accordingly.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of China for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. It is the understanding of the Chair that his statement will appear in the records of the Conference on Disarmament.

I am grateful for the expeditious manner in which the Conference has dealt with the documents before it today. The representative of Brazil has asked for the floor.

Mr. AMORIM (Brazil): Mr. President, first of all, let me also join others in congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency, and formulate my best wishes for the period of your conducting your business. I have just seen several speakers address kind words to me. I want to thank them for this. I am reminded that in what you might call my farewell statement in the last meeting, I was saying I was glad that at least we had a basis for getting on with the work on the report, and I am very glad that, thanks to their spirit of cooperation and compromise, we were able to come to decisions under your presidency. I can assure you that, though these were very hard-working days, they were also a source of intellectual enrichment and personal gratification for me and for my country.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for his statement and for his best wishes to me.

As discussed earlier, I shall address a formal communication to the Chairman of the First Committee, transmitting both reports we have adopted today.

I recognize the distinguished representative of India.

Mr. KUMAR (India): Mr. President, at the outset, let me congratulate you on your assumption of the presidentship. I would like to be among other speakers who have also congratulated Ambassador Amorim for his skilful work which he has done in the Conference and for presenting the reports.

Our delegation would also like to thank the special coordinators for the agenda, Ambassadors Bosch and O'Sullivan, for putting up the text. In the CD this year we have witnessed much faster progress of work in the initial period

(Mr. Kumar, India)

when the CD was able to form the ad hoc committees. In the same positive spirit to reach consensus to make the CD to progress forward, we have gone along with the reports in general terms. However, on the report on the agenda, I would like to emphasize our concern that the CD should continue to give priority to the nuclear disarmament items, including 2 and 3. Secondly, my delegation believes that the CD's role as a single multilateral negotiating body should be maintained.

The PRESIDENT: I wish now to turn to another subject. The secretariat has circulated today the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to any change that might be necessary. On this understanding we may adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our work for today, and I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 25 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.